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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROSPECTIVE 
PURCHASER IS NOT A NECESSARY ELEMENT 
OF THE "NOTE OR MEMORANDUM" REQUIREMENT SET 
FORTH IN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
In its brief, Machan identified the policy 
underlying the Statute of Frauds as follows: 
The Statute of Frauds is intended to 
protect against fraud; it is not intended 
as an escape route for persons seeking to 
avoid obligations undertaken by or implied 
upon them. 
Kiersey v. Hirsch# 265 P.2d 346, 352 (N.M. 1953). To 
fulfill this policy, the statute requires the existence of some 
"note or memorandum" of the agreement between the parties. 
See, Utah Code Annotated, §25-5-4(5). There is no specific 
formula by which one can measure the sufficiency of a 
particular "note or memorandum," and a memorandum which is 
sufficient in one case may well be held insufficient in 
another. 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, §498 at 683. 
In applying the Statute of Frauds, courts are compelled to 
examine the facts of each case to determine whether the "note 
or memorandum" at issue is sufficient to remove any significant 
fear that a fraud is being perpetrated. In such analysis, the 
court is free to consider more than one "note or memorandum" 
and to consider the circumstances surrounding the transaction, 
including parole evidence. Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 
369 (Utah 1980). 
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After citing numerous cases which identify the 
various elements necessary to make a "note or memorandum" 
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, Western argues 
that there is no written instrument, or combination of written 
instruments, which contains an agreement by Western to pay 
Machan a commission upon the sale of the Iomega Park to 
Birtcher. None of the authorities cited by Western, however, 
require as an essential element of the "note or memorandum" the 
specific identification of the purchaser of the property. If 
examined closely, Western's unsupported argument requires a 
real estate broker to specifically identify a ready, willing, 
and able buyer to the seller in the written agreement which 
calls for the payment of a commission to the broker. Under 
such circumstances, no commission agreements would be executed 
because the seller would simply refuse to sign the same and 
contact the identified person directly. 
The issue in this case can be simply stated: did 
Western agree to pay a 4 percent commission to Machan if 
Machan procured a buyer for the Iomega Park and, if so, is 
there some "note or memorandum" which sufficiently identifies 
such agreement so that the Court is reasonably certain a fraud 
is not being perpetrated? Western attempts to confuse the 
Court by arguing that there is no written instrument agreeing 
to pay Machan a commission upon the sale of the Iomega Park 
to Birtcher, and that, in fact, Western expressly rejected 
Machanfs attempt to register Birtcher as a prospective 
client with Western. The registration procedure utilized by 
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the parties herein was designed, however, to avoid 
embarrassment respecting the identification of the broker who 
procured the buyer, not a limitation of the agreement to pay a 
commission. The use or non-use of such registration procedure 
is irrelevant to the question of whether or not Western agreed 
to pay a commission to Machan upon the sale of the Iomega 
Park, and whether such agreement is satisfactorily identified 
by one or more writings. 
Based upon the facts and circumstances set forth in 
Machanfs opening brief, there is no question that Western 
agreed to pay Machan a commission of 4 percent if it procured 
a buyer for the Iomega Park. Arguments that Machan did not 
procure Birtcher as the buyer or did not properly comply with 
Western's registration procedure may constitute a defense to 
Machan's claim for a commission, but such arguments are not 
relevant to the Statute of Frauds issue presented by this 
appeal. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER MACHAN 
PROCURED BIRTCHER AS THE BUYER OF THE 
IOMEGA PARK IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
AND, ACCORDINGLY, CANNOT BE UTILIZED 
TO AFFIRM THE RESULT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION RESPECTING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
In the second part of its brief, Western argues that 
Machan was not the procuring cause of the sale of the 
Iomega Park to Birtcher and, accordingly, this Court may 
affirm the trial court's dismissal on such grounds. In support 
of its argument that this Court may affirm the judgment on any 
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proper ground even if the district court assigned an incorrect 
reason for its ruling, Western cites two cases, the first of 
which is Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860 (Utah 
1979). 
In Allphin, the defendant seller was granted 
summary judgment against plaintiff real estate agent on the 
grounds that the writing in question did not satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal on the grounds that the commission agreement in 
question called for the payment of a commission if the property 
w a s S Ql d t o o n e of the identified prospective buyers. 
Since no sale whatsoever in Allphin took place, and since 
the offer submitted by plaintiff to defendant was from someone 
other than those identified in the commission agreement, the 
Supreme Court was confident that plaintiff did not and could 
not state a cause of action. As a result, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court's dismissal albeit on different 
grounds. 
The second case cited by Western is Berry v. Berry, 
738 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1987). The Berry case is a divorce 
case wherein one spouse attempted to relitigate issues 
previously decided by the court. Such subsequent attempt to 
relitigate was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds 
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit was 
vested in a different court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the dismissal on the principle of collateral 
estoppel. "Because this is a threshold issue, we do not reach 
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the merits of appellant's other points on appeal." Id. at 
250. Neither of these cases supports Western's position that, 
under the facts of this case, this court should affirm the 
district court's decision on the different grounds that 
Machan was not the procuring cause of the sale to 
Birtcher. 
To view the inapplicability of the above-cited cases, 
one need only examine the posture and the facts of the case at 
bar. In this case, both parties early in the litigation moved 
for summary judgment. At the conclusion of the arguments on 
both the merits and the form of the order, the trial court 
granted Western's motion to dismiss Machan's First Cause of 
Action on the basis that the Statute of Frauds was not 
satisfied. The trial court specifically refused to grant 
Western's motion on the alternative ground that, as a matter of 
law, Machan had not procured Birtcher as the buyer of the 
Iomega Park. This refusal is inherently logical in light of 
the fact that the issue of "procuring cause" is a fact intense 
issue, very little discovery by the parties had been completed, 
and both parties had submitted affidavits demonstrating the 
presence of an issue of fact. Even though it did not raise, by 
way of cross appeal, the trial court's refusal to grant summary 
judgment on the issue of "procuring cause," Western now invites 
the court to affirm the trial court's decision on such 
grounds. 
Though Western recognizes that the issue of 
"procuring cause" is one of fact, it cites Hiniger v. 
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Judyf 194 Kan. 155, 398 P.2d 305 (1965), and argues that 
where there is no competent evidence from which a jury could 
reasonably grant the broker's claim, the court may resolve the 
issue of procuring cause as a matter of law. Not surprisingly, 
Western fails to point out to this Court that the Hiniger 
appeal was taken from an adverse jury verdict. In other words, 
both parties had already had the opportunity to fully present 
their case to the jury. With such record in hand, the court 
was able to make a determination as to whether there was any 
evidence to support the jury's verdict. No such opportunity 
was granted in the case at bar. Furthermore, contrary to the 
Hiniger case, there is testimony in the record herein, 
which presents an issue of fact on procuring cause and which, 
if believed, could result in a verdict for Machan. Without 
attempting to list all of the conflicting facts and testimony 
herein, Machan points the Court to the following: 
a. In January, 1985, Machan introduced 
representatives of Birtcher to real 
estate opportunities along the Wasatch 
front area. (Polcha aff'd., para. 5.) 
b. In late February or early January 1985, 
Capitalcorp Financial, Inc. ("Capcorp") 
presented an offer to purchase the Iomega 
Park from Western* (Slavin depo., 
p. 11.) Upon inquiring about the property, 
Machan was informed that its clients who 
were interested in the property should 
understand they were in a backup position. 
(Goddard depo., p. 28, ex. 7.) 
c. Polcha had several conversations with 
Birtcher representatives regarding the 
property, sent them information as 
requested and corresponded with them on an 
on-going basis regarding the property. 
(Polcha aff'd., para. 9; Trachman 
depo., pp. 9-19.) 
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d. In May and June 1985, Polcha had 
telephone conversations with both 
Birtcher and Western. Birtcher 
expressed an interest in the property but 
was waiting to see what happened with the 
original offeror. (Polcha aff'd., 
para. 10.) 
e. The Capcorp offer was scheduled to 
close in April, 1985. Such closing, 
however, was extended to July 15. 
(Slavin depo., pp. 14-15.) 
f. By July 15, 1985, the date the Capcorp 
offer was again scheduled to close, 
Capcorpfs financing had fallen through. 
(Slavin depo., p. 19.) 
g. When Capcorp first tied up the 
property, it mentioned the same to 
Birtcher to see if there was any interest 
by Birtcher on doing something with 
Capcorp on the property. (Slavin 
depo., p. 24.) At such time, Birtcher 
responded that they were not interested. 
(Slavin depo., p. 25.) 
h. Capcorp renewed its efforts with 
Birtcher when its financing fell through 
on or about the latter part of May or first 
part of June, 1985. (Slavin depo., 
p. 26.) 
i. At some time in July, 1985, Western 
telephoned Machan and informed it that 
Capcorp1s deal was foundering and asked 
if Birtcher had an interest in the 
property. Machan called Birtcher and 
informed them that the property might be 
available. A Birtcher representative 
said that he would pull the file and get 
back to Machan. Machan called Western 
and reported the conversation with 
Birtcher. (Polcha afffd., 
para. 11.) 
j. In August, 1985, Machan made several 
telephone calls to Birtcher which went 
unreturned. (Polcha aff'd., para. 
12.) 
k. On September 3, 1985, a Birtcher 
entity known as Birtcher Investments, 
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signed a letter of intent to purchase the 
property. (Goddard depo.# ex. 20.) 
1. On September 6, 1985, Western wrote 
Machan a letter purporting to terminate 
or disavow any obligation to pay Machan a 
commission for the sale of the property to 
Birtcher. (Goddard depo., p. 78, 
ex. 21.) 
m. After inquiry from Machan on 
September 12, 1985, Western claimed that 
"Capcorp/Birtcher" had "presented their 
offer on January 30, 1985, as you well 
know." (Goddard depo., pp. 83-84, 
ex. 23.) 
The foregoing testimony in the record herein clearly 
demonstrates the presence of an issue of fact respecting 
whether Machan was a "procuring cause" of the sale to 
Birtcher. Since the issue of procuring cause has not been 
fully and finally litigated, the principal of collateral 
estoppel does not apply. Since a sale of the property at issue 
has taken place, and since there is testimony in the record 
which, if believed, would support a favorable finding that 
Machan was a "procuring cause" of such sale, Machan in 
entitled to its day in court where it can present, to a jury, 
its entire case. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts and circumstances of this case clearly 
demonstrate the existence of an agreement whereby Western 
agreed to pay a real estate commission to Machan if Machan 
procured a buyer for the Iomega Park. Correspondence by and 
between the parties and the parole evidence respecting the 
facts and circumstances of this case clearly demonstrate that 
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